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Abstract
“Political dynasty” refers to the situation wherein members of the same family are occupying 
elected positions either in sequence for the same position, or simultaneously across different 
positions. In the Philippines, political dynasties are prevalent in areas with more severe poverty. 
Two explanations for this situation have been proposed: poverty brings about political dynasties, 
or political dynasties engender poverty. These arguments suggest that the relationship between 
political dynasties and poverty can be treated as an empirical question. (So which one is the 
chicken, and which one is the egg?) In order to examine the direction of causality between 
political dynasties and poverty, this paper turns to provincial-level data from the Philippines and 
develops novel metrics on political dynasties: the shares of total positions occupied by dynastic 
politicians, of the largest dynastic clan as regards total positions, and of dynastic concentration 
inspired by the industrial concentration literature. To address endogeneity, instrumental variables 
for poverty are used, consisting of indicators for rainfall and the geographical distance to Manila 
(the Capital). The results we find are striking: poverty entrenches political dynasties; education 
appears to have no bearing on political dynasties; and the media affect only the largest political 
dynasties. There is less evidence that political dynasties bring about poverty. 
JEL Codes: D70; I39; O53; P16 
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21. Introduction
“Political dynasty” refers to the situation wherein members of the same family are occupying 
elected positions either in sequence for the same position or simultaneously across different 
positions. The political science literature maintains that political dynasties are significant in the 
deterioration of political competition; and, consequently, they contribute to poor socioeconomic 
outcomes. There are several reasons that can support such a conclusion. For instance, political 
dynasties can be effective in preventing the people from communicating their real needs to the
government. They can weaken existing governance and accountability mechanisms to secure
their positions. More specifically, dynastic officials can take advantage of state power for self-
serving interests without fear of replacement or administrative sanctions; or, use state power to 
influence the selection of political leaders, thereby favoring those with political clout, preventing 
the best and the brightest from serving in the government, and/or biasing policies in favor of 
certain elite groups.1
On the other hand, there is also a view that political dynasties imply extended time horizons for 
socio-economic reforms and enable adequate planning and implementation of policies with long-
term goals. Politicians with short and/or tenuous tenures tend to shun the difficult but necessary 
reforms that pay-off in the future and yield to populist demands in order to improve their chances 
of reelection. The extended time horizons of political dynasties afford them the longer reform 
runways necessary to pursue policies and programs that are critical to sustained, robust, and 
inclusive economic growth (c.f., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Rodrik 2007). It is also possible 
that the behavior of dynastic politicians is driven by legacy-related goals that are linked with the 
overall outcomes in their respective jurisdictions. Thus, the longer their tenure is, the more they 
tend to care about long term outcomes. 
Given both sets of arguments above, the net impact of political dynasties on social and economic 
outcomes remains an empirical question. Do political dynasties exacerbate poverty, or does 
poverty escalate political dynasties? So which one is the “chicken,” and which one is the “egg”?
                                                          
1 For a discussion, see Lacey (1993), Cullinane (1994), McCoy (1994a; 1994b) Sidel (1997), Coronel (1998; 2007),
Hutchcroft and Rocamora (2003), Manacsa and Tan (2005), Teehankee (2007), Curato (2012), Mendoza (2012), and 
David (2013).
3This paper develops a unique dataset on political dynasties in the Philippines in order to analyze 
the extent to which dynasties might be linked to poverty. It presents the first, and to our 
knowledge most comprehensive, data gathering effort to map the landscape of political dynasties 
at the local government (i.e. provincial) level in the Philippines.2 Our results provide strong 
evidence that increases in poverty incidence result in increases in the prevalence of political 
dynasties using several measures (e.g. all at the provincial level, the share of total positions 
occupied by dynastic politicians, the share of the largest dynastic clan as regards total positions, 
and an indicator of dynastic concentration inspired by the industrial concentration literature). 
This suggests that patron-client relationships between political elites and the economically weak
may tend to reinforce political dynasties. In addition, education (using school attendance rates as 
proxy) does not appear to produce a significant effect on political dynasties, which suggests that 
education per se is futile against political dynasties. On the other hand, the presence of media 
(using the number of AM radio stations as proxy) appears negatively linked to political 
dynasties, but only when measured in terms of political concentration. This, in turn, suggests that 
the provision of public information through the media can be instrumental in mitigating the size 
of political dynasties. 
On the other hand, our results on the effect of political dynasties on poverty are less conclusive. 
Political dynasties do not seem to be associated with either more or less poverty reduction. We 
interpret this finding as possible evidence that non-dynasties may not be offering viable 
alternatives for reform. This interpretation is consistent with anecdotal and other evidence that 
the existing political “rules of the game” are in part perpetuating patron-client relationships and, 
thus, encouraging the proliferation of new political dynasties—that is, those who replace political 
dynasties eventually become political dynasties themselves. In a way, the weak support of 
political parties for genuine political and electoral reform helps perpetuate this system of politics 
in the country. 
                                                          
2 Other empirical studies in the Philippines have not yet reflected the full mapping of political dynasties at the level 
of the local government (i.e. province). See, for example, Balisacan and Fuwa (2004), Querrubin (2010; 2011) and 
Mendoza et al (2012) that look at political dynasties in the country at the aggregate level.
4The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. Following the introduction, Section 2 presents 
a brief review of the literature on the relationship between political dynasties and socioeconomic 
outcomes. Section 3 describes the methodology and the data used in the study. Section 4
elaborates on the findings. The last section presents the implications of the findings and then 
concludes the discussion.
2. Review of Related Literature
There is an extensive literature on political dynasties; yet few studies focus on empirically 
examining their impact on socio-economic outcomes. The bottom line questions pertain to 
causality: Are political dynasties responsible for persistent poverty (i.e., perpetuating the status 
quo, weakening democratic competition and accountability, and undermining meritocracy and 
competitiveness); or, does poverty generate political dynasties (i.e., strengthening patron-client 
relations defined by a dependence of the poor on political patrons and preventing the emergence 
of new leaders from the middle class)? In this section, we briefly discuss three sets of literature, 
covering political self-perpetuation, the links between political dynasties and socioeconomic 
outcomes, and the role played by education and media in politics. Taken together, these studies 
piece together a framework on how to tackle the questions posed earlier.
Self-perpetuation
Political dynasties exist in many democracies, and there appears to be strong evidence on elected 
officials’ ability to self perpetuate. Dal Bo et al. (2009) examined data on the Congress of the 
United States since it was established in 1789 to uncover the forces that bring about political 
dynasties. They hypothesize that (1) political dynasties emerge because some families possess 
certain characteristics (like political ambition and acuity), giving them persistent advantages in 
the political arena and; (2) political dynasties emerge because political capital and influence can 
be accumulated and bequeathed to family members. Their study showed a large decline in 
political dynasties in the US Congress over time: from 12 percent of legislators that were 
dynastic between 1789 and 1858 to six percent after 1966. Further, given the availability of the 
General Social Survey for 1972-2004 for the USA, the authors were able to estimate that 
dynasties for the USA was still higher for legislators compared to many other occupations, 
including economists and physicians. Using regression discontinuity as an identification strategy, 
5they found a causal link between longer tenures in the US Congress and the likelihood that 
relatives also successfully enter the Congress.3 This finding suggests that a politician’s time in 
office could help build a strong image or trusted “brand” that further contributes to the success of 
family members who might later also run for office.
Dal Bo et al. (2009) also found an inverse relationship between the presence of a political 
dynasty and the degree of political competition within their jurisdictions. One possible 
explanation, they posited, is that under intense political competition, political parties are forced 
to field non-dynastic and more talented candidates over dynastic candidates. They observed that 
dynastic officials predominate in less open, less mobile and less competitive states. Political 
dynasties were also observed to maintain a presence in more exclusive legislative bodies like that 
of the US Senate. If longer Congressional tenure increases the probability of an official 
establishing a dynasty, then the transmission of the office to another member of the family may 
be due not so much to the newer officials' personal qualities valued by voters (such as experience 
or human capital) but more due to connections with a stronger party machinery. This course is 
therefore a possible explanation why dynasties prevail in states where political competition is 
weaker.        
In addition, Rossi (2009) examined the persistence of political dynasties using data on both 
houses of the Argentine Congress. In this study, a political dynasty is measured as a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if the legislator had a relative who also served in the Argentine 
Senate. In order to deal with the endogeneity issue (i.e. of tenure and elected official’s 
characteristics), Rossi used a natural experimental setting in Argentina in 1983 when shorter and 
longer tenures in the Senate (as mandated by the new constitution) were randomly assigned.4
Similar to Dal Bo et al. (2009), this study by Rossi (2009) in Argentina also finds evidence that a 
                                                          
3 The authors compared legislators who barely won and barely lost their electoral campaigns: those who barely won 
their first reelection were more likely to have a relative entered Congress than those who barely lost their first 
reelection. 
4 Previously, Argentine Senators had nine-year terms. The Argentine Constitution required the renewal of a third of 
the chamber every three years. In order to accomplish this, they randomly allocated one third of the senators elected 
in 1983 to three-year terms and another one third to six- year terms. This exogenous assignment of terms is not 
associated with the characteristics of the Senators, hence serving as a viable identification strategy.
6longer tenure in office is positively associated with having a relative serving in the same office in 
the future. Longer tenure increases the probability of a relative in a future Congress, name 
recognition is an important asset in the perpetuation of a political dynasty and, in fact, a common 
surname dominates the advantage of a longer tenure in raising the probability of establishing a 
dynasty.
Furthermore, Asako et al. (2010) developed a theoretical model of the behavior of dynastic 
politicians with inherited political advantages. They predicted that, first, dynastic candidates 
possess an electoral advantage over non-dynastic candidates and, second, dynastic politicians 
pursue distributional programs but do not promote sustained growth because spending on 
redistribution programs was small.5 These authors attempted to validate their theoretical model 
using data on the National Diet of Japan. To deal with the endogeneity problem, Asako et al. 
used the number of male children of previous lawmakers as an instrumental variable since 
Japanese lawmakers passed on their political seat only to their male children. Hence, having 
male children is a good predictor of continued dynastic rule.6 However, the gender of the 
lawmakers’ children would not be linked to the transfer programs from the central government. 
Their results indicate that districts electing dynastic legislators tend to benefit from larger 
intergovernmental transfers, yet they display weaker economic performance. The authors argued 
that this is largely due to the type of spending these leaders favor—typically focused on much 
smaller groups, even as they tend to bring more transfers to their districts. 
Recent empirical analyses on political dynasties in the Philippine Congress found similar results 
on self-perpetuation. Defining dynasties in a similar way as the earlier studies above, Querubin 
(2010a) found that over 50 percent of legislators in the Philippine Congress and governors had a 
relative who was also in Congress or served as governor in the previous 20 years. He estimated 
                                                          
5 These results are consistent Solon et al. (2009), who studied the public education and health spending of Philippine 
Governors elected in 1992, 1995 and 1998. Solon et al. (2009) found evidence that incumbent governors improve 
their re-election chances with higher spending on economic development services. 
6 During the period between 1996 and 2007, over 90 percent of Japanese politicians are male. Daughters are unlikely 
to form part of political dynasties. Of over 120 Japanese politicians described as dynastic, only 3 are women (Asako 
et al. 2010).
7that the capacity for self-perpetuation of Filipino legislators is three times higher than that of 
legislators in the United States (i.e. Dal Bo et al. 2009). Furthermore, Mendoza, et al. (2012) 
found evidence that political dynasties in the 15th Congress won by much larger margins of 
victory, and tended to be wealthier. Nevertheless, they found that Philippine provinces with 
higher levels of political dynasties also displayed higher levels of poverty and weaker indicators 
of human development. 
Like Dal Bo et al. (2009) and Rossi (2006), Solon et al. (2009) estimated the probability of 
governors being reelected, using a logit framework and panel data on Philippine governors for 
1992-1998. Their results argue that an increase in development-oriented projects (specifically 
expenditures on health care and public works) would tend to increase the probability of re-
election, especially in the lower income provinces.7 Interestingly, provincial per capita income 
tended to grow lesser in the provinces with a lack of political competition, whether among rival 
dynasties, or between dynastic and non-dynastic candidates. This latter conclusion seems to 
confirm a result of Dal Bo et al. (2009).  
Schaffer (2002) also studied the practice of vote buying in the Philippines, and his analysis 
revealed how low-income voters tend to prefer candidates and political groups that show respect 
and a degree of compassion to the low-income population. Thus, the advocacies of middle class 
groups and stakeholders that have used advertisements and leaflets to advocate against vote-
selling are often regarded as patronizing by low income voters. Indeed, as Schaffer (2002) 
argues, these voters do not see themselves as selling their votes. It is possible that political 
dynasties have mastered the art of supporting poor and vulnerable communities, while still 
showing a measure of respect and compassion that low-income voters appreciate. This view is in 
                                                          
7 Similarly, Capuno et al. (2012) analyze a panel dataset of municipalities and cities in three election years in the 
Philippines. They find evidence that yardstick competition in social insurance provision (i.e. more subsidized 
insurance coverage for the poor in neighboring local governments) leads to an increase in coverage offered by 
incumbent politicians. They interpret the situation as a strategy to secure political support during elections. Analysts 
also contend that the use of the so-called “pork barrel” funds is geared towards increasing the chances of re-election 
and perpetuating the hold on political office (e.g. Parreño 1998; Ravanilla 2012).
8sharp contrast to the non-dynastic and progressive groups, which typically advance the messages 
of empowerment, self-help and voter responsibility. 
More recently, Ravanilla (2012) finds evidence that political dynasties may use public funds to 
support allies and clan members. His analysis of the disbursement of the constituent development 
fund (CDF) of legislators tends to favor local patrons, particularly mayoral partisan allies in their 
districts. Such a skewed allocation of resources could also potentially weaken the chances to 
attain policy objectives such as poverty reduction, as argued by Mendoza, et al. (2012). Hence, 
self-perpetuation and (less robust) poverty reduction outcomes may actually be linked, even as it 
appears that political patrons are trying to spend public funds in a “pro-poor” way. 
Political dynasties and poverty
There are few rigorous empirical studies on the extent to which political dynasties are causally 
linked to poverty and other socio-economic outcomes. The notable studies in this regard are 
Asako et al. (2010) and Balisacan and Fuwa (2004). The latter looked at economic growth and 
poverty reduction in Philippine provinces between 1988 and 1997, examining a number of 
possible factors behind this, which included the prevalence of political dynasties at the provincial 
level. They interpreted political dynasties (measured as the proportion of provincial officials 
related to each other by blood or affinity) as a proxy for political competition, i.e. there is lack of 
political competitiveness if there are more dynasties. Among the initial economic conditions in 
their regression framework, they found that the initial level of human capital stock (as measured 
by the child mortality rate) was negatively linked to provincial consumption per capita.
Balisacan and Fuwa (2004) also found that initial inequality in land distribution is positively 
linked to income growth. Their political dynasty variable also had a statistically significant 
negative effect on subsequent per capita income growth. This result, they argued, was in line 
with the literature on Philippine politics, asserting that the Philippines’ uncompetitive political 
system has become one of the major factors behind poor policies and lackluster economic 
performance. However, these same authors found very little evidence that political dynasties are 
9linked to poverty at the provincial level.8 The authors note that there is much scope for 
improving on their empirical analysis, considering that the political dynasty variable was 
primarily derived from interviews, rather than being constructed from actual identification of 
political dynasties based on a clear definition. In part, this study seeks to address this challenge.
Education and media
Finally, the political science literature helps shed light on some of the possible reasons behind
these empirical results. Teehankee (2007), for example, argues that the emergence and 
persistence of political dynasties stems from the highly unequal socio-economic structure of 
Philippine society and the failure of the country to develop a truly democratic electoral and party 
system. Weak institutions and their associated outcomes—such as education—also contribute to 
an environment wherein power is effectively monopolized by a small elite group. The inability 
of the majority to contest the elite sets the stage for the emergence of numerous political 
dynasties. 
The above view emphasizes how poverty and inequality could help create the demand for 
patrons. In an environment beset with aggregate shocks and crises, and absent a strong social 
safety net (e.g. unemployment insurance, health insurance, redistributive transfers), the poor 
have little recourse but to seek support from local patrons. This situation helps in entrenching
personality-based politics and governance. Hence, political dynasties may be a manifestation of 
economic inequalities in the political sphere (Mendoza 2012).
Meanwhile, Coronel (2007) suggests that a combination of factors like wealth, popularity, 
political machinery, alliances, myth, and violence contribute to the formation of political 
dynasties.9 In addition, Sidel (1997) notes that Philippine politicians have to spend an inordinate 
                                                          
8 In any case, the poverty data for the Philippines are relatively stagnant across time. Balisacan and Fuwa (2004) 
note that even during the 1960s to 1970s (when high aggregate income growth ensued), poverty reduction was 
minimal. When poverty reduction was at its highest from 1980s to 1990s, the rate was still below the international 
standard (Deolalikar 2001; Ravallion 2001). 
9 The annex of this paper contains selected examples of Philippine political dynasties, and a schematic mapping of 
one political clan.
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amount of money to have an effective campaign because of the need to combat and/or engage in 
vote buying, electoral fraud, and coercion.10 In turn, access to elected office opens opportunities 
and resources to enable political dynasties to consolidate and expand their economic and power 
bases (McCoy 1994a, 1994b).11 Coronel notes further that popularity often plays a prominent 
role in the establishment of political dynasties in the country, especially for the national-level 
politics. 
Media thus plays an important role in promoting certain “personalities”, helping to solidify name
recall among the electorate. Teehankee (2007) posits that the primacy of the media in elections 
has enabled a number of politicians to build the foundations of their dynasties upon their 
projected public images. Name recall and recognition serve to cultivate the image of a candidate, 
reinforce political viability, and facilitate the emergence of a political dynasty. Most analysts 
also concede that this has created strong incentives for politicians to promote name recognition 
through various means, including by seeking to “label” projects and programs, as well as 
infrastructure (such as schools, health centers and roads). 
But the work of Schaffer (2002) also underscores the importance of also understanding the 
perspective of the poor with regards to the role of elections and voting. In what seems to be an
understudied phenomenon, Schaffer utilized focus groups discussions and interviews among 
low-income voters in a few communities and noted the disparity in attitudes and presuppositions 
between the poor and the reform-minded, generally non-dynastic political organizations like the 
National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections and the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible 
Voting in the Philippines. He further noted that many of the information and advertising materials 
seemed quite patronizing to the poor, many of whom claimed to be offended by the presumption 
that the poor are willing to sell their votes. Indeed, the study participants insisted that they would 
like a measure of respect and compassion shown to them, by way of the candidates’ manner of 
dealing with voters, their political slogans and statements, and their demeanor toward the poor.
                                                          
10 Indeed, Querubin (2010) finds that dynastic incumbents were about 50 percent richer than non-dynastic ones.
11 Filipino elite families succeeded in transforming their entrepreneurial success as political success in both the local 
and national level, or vice versa. See, for example, McCoy (1994a).
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Perhaps, these types of political interaction are more easily adopted and developed among the 
dynastic rather than the non-dynastic political groups. 
It is also likely, in our view, that reform-minded politicians will face challenges in changing 
mindsets as far as patron-client relationships are concerned. Attempts to change these long-
engrained relationships could also be misinterpreted as measures to “correct” the behavior of the 
poor, or as being insensitive to the conditions that they face. Indeed, in our own conversations 
with reform-oriented politicians, they have expressed some difficulty in changing the patron-
client discourse and relationship. From the study of Clarke and Sison (2003: 221), a sample of
Philippine politicians surmised that:
“There are some politicians who wish there were more poor people. The poor are the 
bailiwick because […] if you are a moneyed politician, it’s better to have poor people 
because you can buy them. Give them P200, P300 in the elections and they will vote for 
you.” 
“I’m just vice mayor but you know I have an average of twenty to thirty people every day 
in [my] house, in [my] office, asking for support. I have no money and they need money. 
Even if it’s P100, I’m spending P2000 a day. It’s good I have other businesses, if not 
you’ll be forced to steal money from the government to give to the poor […].”
“[…] Once you’re a government official, people think you are a rich person, that you can 
get money from the government. That’s not true…My salary is only P21,000 [per 
month].”
Coronel (2007) also notes that political dynasties often consolidate their power through mergers, 
while Sidel (1997) adds that several dynasties owe their success to their close affiliation with 
more powerful political entities. Further, this effort to consolidate power and influence may be 
seen in efforts by certain political clans to occupy several elected positions simultaneously. 
These strategies enable prospective political dynasties to draw upon larger pools of resources and 
broaden their political influence.12
                                                          
12 Gerring et al. (2005) examine the relationship of economic growth and democracy among several countries over a 
long period and argue that democracy can be regarded more as a stock variable rather than a flow. 
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Indeed, recent patterns of non-dynastic leaders seeking to build their own political dynasties 
reflect this pattern. Take for instance the widely known boxer-turned-legislator, Emmanuel 
"Manny" Pacquiao, who ran unopposed as Congressman during the May 2013 elections, while 
his brother Rogelio also ran for Congressman (of another district), and his wife Jinkee ran for 
Vice-Governor of Sarangani Province.
3. Methodology and Data
We use two regression frameworks to examine the empirical relationship between political 
dynasties and poverty in the Philippines. The first framework follows the neoclassical growth 
model and the other uses a reduced form model that is based on the political science literature on 
what factors might influence the development and persistence of political dynasties. The 
juxtaposition of these two approaches allows for a more comprehensive test of which direction of 
causality appears to have stronger evidence.
Factors behind poverty, including indicators of political dynasties
Following Balisacan and Fuwa (2004), we specify the following regression model:
   (1)
where is the average annual rate of change in the headcount poverty ratio during the 
period under analysis; is the level of per capita expenditures for province i in 
2003 (i.e., initial period under analysis); is a set of determinants of the steady-state income 
level consisting of initial conditions and time-varying policy variables; and is the error term.
The initial conditions included measures of human capital (child mortality and literacy), 
institutions (agricultural area under irrigation, change in agricultural terms of trade, access to 
electricity, road density, and land covered by agrarian reform), and political competition in the 
province. The initial political characteristic of each province was indicated by the proportion of 
provincial officials related to each other by blood relations or affinity, as a proxy for political 
competitiveness.13
                                                          
13 Balisacan and Fuwa (2004) used expert opinions to approximate the dynasty indicator per province.
13
Our regressions use data from around 2003 to 2009, which is the same dataset used in Mendoza 
et al. (2012), but herein expanded to cover the entire top echelon of local government leadership. 
In addition, more nuanced indicators for political dynasties are used here, namely:
 DYNSHA: The variable builds on the dynasty indicator used in Balisacan and 
Fuwa (2004) by defining and encoding the actual number of dynasties (and not 
just the approximated share based on experts’ opinions). First, dynasties are 
defined as those elected officials in 2010 with relatives in 2010 and 2007; and 
then the actual number of dynasties encumbering the top local government 
positions are more precisely measured, and covering the following positions: 
governor, vice-governor, mayor, vice-mayor, district based representatives and 
provincial board members. DYNSHA is a measure of the share of dynasties in all 
these positions for each province. 
 DYNLAR: In order to account for the potentially large size of particular clans—
or the presence of “fat” dynasties—DYNLAR indicates the number of positions 
encumbered by the largest political dynasty in each province. Its value added as 
an indicator could be clarified by this simple thought experiment. In province A, 
ten elected positions are occupied by eight dynastic officials that are not related to 
each other–that is, they are from eight distinct political clans, but they each have 
relatives in past elected positions in the province. In province B, also with ten 
elected positions available, eight dynastic officials are all related to each other—
that is, they are from one political clan and they all have a family member serving 
in an elected position in the past. The DYNSHA indicator will be the same value 
of eight, for provinces A and B. However, the DYNLAR indicator will reflect the 
value one for province A and the value eight for province B. DYNLAR therefore 
helps to capture the possible effect of more concentrated political power even 
among political dynasties.
 DYNHERF: Another way to capture the presence of “fat” dynasties is to draw on 
the industrial regulation literature and use a variant of the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
14
index applied to political dynasties at the provincial level. Essentially, DYNHERF 
is the sum of squared shares of the total positions of each political clan in each 
province. Hence, if there are 10 elected positions in province A, and there are 
three political clans, with family members elected to three positions for clan-1, 
two positions for clan-2 and one position for clan-3, and the five other elected 
positions are non-dynasties, then DYNHERF will take the value 14—that is, 
32+22+12. DYNHERF is a more nuanced indicator of the concentration of political 
power because it will put a corresponding greater weight on those political clans 
with larger shares of the total positions (while also considering the other “fat” 
dynasties in the province).
The dependent variable in Equation 1 is the change in headcount poverty between 2003 and 2006 
in each province. The initial conditions were drawn from data collected from 2002 and 2003. 
Most of the measures for institutions were taken from 2002 and 2004. Only the change in road 
density, one of the measures of time-varying conditions, was taken from 2002 and 2008 because 
of the absence of data for 2004.
Drawing on the literature, the a priori expected results are as follows. First, political dynasties 
could have a strong positive association with poverty incidence. This view posits that decreased 
political competition arises because political dynasties, in turn reflecting a tendency for weaker 
accountability. On the other hand, political dynasties might also possess a long runway for 
reform, as well as legacy motivations, in turn suggesting a negative relationship with poverty—
that is, due to their long runway for policy reforms, political dynasties could be more successful 
in reducing poverty (e.g., Mendoza et al. 2012).
In addition, the lagged measures of human capital are expected to be negatively associated with 
poverty incidence. Higher levels of human capital are associated with better access to a wider 
array of socioeconomic opportunities and outcomes. Further, higher scores on institutional 
variables are expected to translate to lower levels of poverty incidence. 
Factors behind political dynasties, including poverty
15
Given the dearth in indicators for dynastic politics, few studies have empirically examined the 
possible factors behind political dynasties. Here, we draw primarily from political science and 
economic development literatures in order to identify possible factors that may influence the 
prevalence of political dynasties. Given the potential endogeneity between poverty and political 
dynasties, we deploy an instrumental variable regression model in lieu of an ordinary least 
squares regression model. The instrumental variables used to estimate poverty are average 
annual rainfall and the distance to the Philippine capital city of Manila.14 Our regression model is 
thus
   (2)
where the dynasty indicators include DYNSHA, DYNLAR and DYNHERF and the right-hand 
side indicators represent factors that contribute to the prevalence of political dynasties:15
 FAMPOVINC09 is family poverty incidence in 2009. It is possible that more 
families mired in poverty in a province perpetuate the prevailing patron-client 
relationships that help to protect poor families from income shocks and poverty 
and thus keep political clans in power. 
 AMS refers to the number of AM Radio Stations operating in each province. This 
indicator is a proxy variable to capture the relative strength of the media, which 
could help level the playing field by helping to temper excesses of those in power, 
as well as providing a platform for civil society and non-dynastic leaders to 
engage the public and electorate.
                                                          
14 These instruments have been used in the literature examining poverty and income, as both of these tend to be 
endogenous with other contextual variables (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).
15 Given the evidence on possible “yardstick competition” in public services provision, it is possible that contiguous 
provinces exert some influence on the level of political competition in a province (e.g., Capuno et al. 2012). Thus, 
we estimate Equation 2 with a contiguity matrix to help capture the possible influence of sharing a common border 
with another province. The findings, however, are not qualitatively different from those that do not include a 
continuity matrix. The results are available upon request.
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 ARMM is a dummy variable for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. It 
takes a value of one for a province belonging in the ARMM and zero otherwise. 
The ARMM indicator seeks to capture the different leadership pattern in this area 
given its distinct historical and cultural background.
 Other controls are included in order to test the robustness of the poverty-dynasty 
relationship. These indicators include a measure of human development (HDI1),  
education derived from primary and secondary student to teacher ratios 
(EDUC08), and average per capita income in 2006 (PCI06). With higher average 
income, human development and education it is possible that the demand for 
protection and support from a patron may diminish, and new leaders could arise, 
leading to a more competitive political environment.
Based on the literature elaborating on patron-client relationships, increases in poverty incidence 
would be expected to increase the prevalence of political dynasties. A greater proportion of the 
electorate living below the poverty line provides political dynasties more opportunities to engage 
in transactional politics, possibly exploiting the absence of a social safety net and the poor 
people’s need for protection and support. In addition, more AM Radio Stations would imply a 
stronger media presence in a province, so they are expected to help in leveling the political 
playing field and thus decrease political dynasties. A stronger media would afford the electorate 
(1) more opportunities to promote transparency and (2) provide a viable means to hold errant 
officials accountable. Moreover, provinces in the ARMM are expected to have many political 
dynasties because of its sociopolitical structures and history that include non-democratic and 
hierarchical leadership structures (e.g. sultanates). Finally, the measures of human development 
such as education, HDI, and per capita income are expected to diminish political dynasties
because increases in these variables can be argued to weaken patron-client relationships and 
systems of transactional politics. 
Table 1 briefly summarizes the variables used in our empirical analyses, their definitions and 
sources. 
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[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE…]
4. Results
Given the methodology of this paper, we obtain two sets of regression results and, in turn, we 
present them sequentially.
Do political dynasties cause more poverty? 
The results for the models that build on Balisacan and Fuwa (2004) are presented in tables 2-4. 
Similar to their findings, we also find evidence that the initial per capita expenditures is positive 
with regard to its link to the change in average poverty headcount (p < 0.05). Notice, though, that 
the coefficient on the initial per capita expenditure is increasing as additional variables are added 
to the regression model. This pattern thus reveals a strong poverty hysteresis in the Philippines 
despite the introduction of economic reforms, and it bolsters our findings on the reverse causality 
of political dynasty (below). As with Balisacan and Fuwa (2004), agrarian reform has positive
link to the change in average poverty headcount (p < 0.01). This result confirms the argument 
that land distribution is fundamental for poverty reduction in the country. The coefficient on 
agricultural terms of trade turns out to have no statistical effect on poverty reduction, a finding 
that diverges from that of Balisacan and Fuwa (2004). 
[INSERT TABLES 2-4 HERE…]
The other results for DYNSHA, DYNLAR, and HYNHERF indicate no statistical significance, 
albeit their estimated coefficients have negative signs. We argue that political dynasties are not 
necessarily associated with any more (or any less) poverty reduction when compared to non-
dynasties. Specifically, the results suggest that non-dynasties, on average, may be failing to offer 
better governance that lead to significant reduction in poverty. Indeed, this interpretation coheres 
with the observation that political parties in the country are not really offering nor supporting 
polices that benefit the poor but instead are introducing policies that entrench political dynasties. 
Even some non-traditional and non-dynastic politicians that are elected into office appear to be 
pulled to engage in the traditional politics and form new dynastic clans of their own.16 We 
further argue that our results suggest that a long runway view of larger and stronger political 
                                                          
16 See among others Coronel (1998; 2007), Manacsa and Tan (2005), McCoy (1994a; 1994b) and Teehankee (2007).
18
dynasties for reform and legacy motivations may be behind the success in poverty reduction as 
evidenced by an observed negative relationship between DYNLAR and headcount poverty as 
well as between DYNHERF and headcount poverty, albeit the results indicate no statistical 
significance.
Does poverty create more dynasties?
Tables 5-7 summarize the regression results for Equation 2 using an instrumental variables 
technique to address the possible endogeneity of poverty with dynastic patterns.17 Regressions 1-
4 (respectively, columns 1-4) in each table represent the equations using per capita income as an 
additional right-hand-side variable with poverty. Regressions 5-8 use the human development 
indicator per province instead (columns 5-8). Then, regressions 9-12 use an education quality 
indicator (columns 9-12).
[INSERT TABLES 5-7 HERE…]
The results indicate that both poverty incidence and per capita income are not determinants of 
DYNSHA (both p = n.s.) but both variables are determinants of DYNLAR and of DYNHERF
(both p < 0.05). These findings suggest that increased income poverty does not induce political 
dynasties to emerge but it contributes to the expansion of the largest and strongest political 
dynasties. Given that the poor are most vulnerable to political patronage and manipulation as 
well as practical to sell their votes, a worsening, if not unchanging, poverty would be beneficial 
to political dynasties. Since the largest political dynasties would, in most situations, be the 
families that have cultivated the most extensive networks of patronage, accumulated the most 
political and financial capital, and have the access to the largest political machineries, they would 
also be in the best position to take advantage of vulnerable economically disadvantaged voters. 
Underpinning this patron-client relationship is a complex set of interactions that appear to favor 
dynastic politicians and their progeny (over non-dynastic newcomers, for example). We surmise 
                                                          
17 The regressions reported in tables 5-7 use the IVREG command in STATA. Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests confirm 
the necessity of using the instruments to help deal with the endogeneity between poverty and political dynasties as 
measured by DYNLAR and DYNHERF. Consistent OLS estimates are possible for DYNSHA. However, table 5 
present IVREG results given that OLS estimates yield very similar findings. 
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that political dynasties have mastered both the art of dealing with voters respectfully and 
compassionately and the art of assuming a facade of identification with the poor. In our own 
assessment, such knowledge and skill are then taught to the next generation of politicians. In 
addition, a demonstrated history of violence and intimidation could result in long-held beliefs 
that patrons are needed to keep peace and order in the locality, or prevent even more injustice 
and poverty from taking place.  It is, of course, usual to see for voters in conflict-prone areas of 
the Philippines to favor “strongmen” and their progeny in order to prevent more “competitive” 
but potentially more violent elections from taking place (c.f., Sidel, 1994; Beckett 1994; Bentley
1994). 
It can be argued then that improvements in the economic conditions of Filipinos do not 
necessarily result in the dissolution of political dynasties or the prevention of the emergence of 
new political dynasties. The economic improvement could nevertheless help weaken political 
dynasties in the long run by preventing them from further entrenching themselves in elective 
positions and subordinating government institutions to political agendas of their families. 
While poverty incidence and per capita income explain DYNLAR and DYNHERF, the size of 
the coefficients is small to indicate significant impact. We thus argue that economic interventions 
have to generate dramatic increases in incomes in order to obtain meaningful decreases in the 
influence of the largest and strongest political dynasties. In fact, this view is consistent with the 
notion that, in the short run, the economic interventions designed to reduce the level of control 
exerted by the largest and strongest political dynasties have to be directed at improving political 
democracy—that is, strengthening democratic institutions and encouraging more active citizen 
participation in democratic processes. 
Moreover, we find AM Radio Stations as a determinant of DYNSHA, DYNLAR, DYNHERF (at 
least p < 0.10 for all). While the coefficient is positive with DYNSHA, it is nonetheless negative 
with DYNLAR and DYNHERF. We argue that AM Radio Stations cultivate an environment that 
is conducive to the emergence of new political dynasties that represent alternatives to the larger 
and stronger political dynasties. Increases in the number of AM Radio Stations, therefore, 
promote political competition but only amongst the political dynasties, we further argue that this 
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situation may be an artifact of the poor development of political party system in the Philippines, 
as noted by Manacsa and Tan (2005) and Teehankee (2007).
Education is significant but only in regressions that include AMS (p < 0.10). The coefficients are 
positive involving DYNLAR and DYNHERF but negative involving DYNSHA. An explanation 
for this pattern involves the influence of political dynasties in the local public education system,
which offers numerous opportunities to cultivate patronage relationships through scholarship 
grants and infrastructure expenditure support. Indeed, as noted by Solon et al. (2009), the social 
spending in the Philippines has become a means for securing political support and votes. The 
dominant political dynasty can thus channel resources into education projects and programs that 
identify their members as politicians with only the interest of the locals in their hearts. As noted 
earlier, Ravanilla (2012) finds evidence of such pattern—that is, legislators use their pork barrel 
to benefit political allies and to those that can readily assign credit to the source of funds. 
Moreover, given strong norms for reciprocity and personal indebtedness, the increased 
investments in the local public education system would help strengthen further the dominant 
political dynasties. Indeed, this view runs counter to the position that improved education among 
the electorate would lead to more informed choices and less political dynasties elected into 
office.
Finally, the coefficients of ARMM are positive and significant across all the regressions (p < 
0.05). The findings are consistent with view that the distinct configuration of leadership and 
social dynamics within the region allows for the emergence and success of large and strong 
political dynasties (Beckett, 1994; Bentley, 1994). 
6. Conclusion 
Political dynasties are linked to weak political competition, poor accountability, concentration of 
political power, and perpetuation of patron-client relations and traditional politics. Under these 
conditions, political dynasties contribute in sustaining poverty in a country. On the other hand, it 
is also acknowledged that poor people often constitute large segments of the voting population
who are likely to be easily swayed into supporting political patrons who provide benefits that are 
quickly attributed to the patron. This pattern takes place under conditions of poverty and extreme 
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vulnerability, further exacerbated by the lack of a social safety net. The self-perpetuation of 
political dynasties is therefore understandable when politics is defined by patron-client 
relationships. This complex relationship suggests that political dynasties could exacerbate 
poverty, or poverty itself could enable the self-perpetuation of political dynasties. This paper 
examined the more dominant direction of causality between political dynasties and poverty.
Using novel and comprehensive metrics on political dynasties, we uncovered strong evidence 
that the more severe poverty is, the higher is the prevalence of political dynasties. We argued that 
patron-client relationships are the recourse of the poor, and these in turn reinforce the self-
perpetuation of political dynasties. In fact, the evidence suggests that areas with more poor 
people tend to have many political dynasties.
Yet, we also found evidence that political dynasties may not necessarily be affecting poverty. 
That is, political dynasties neither reduce nor increase poverty. We argued that this pattern is an 
indication that the non-dynasties (i.e. the benchmark against which dynasties are compared) may 
not be presenting themselves as viable alternatives to political dynasties. In other words, it is 
difficult to recognize whether the approach of political dynasties to reform would benefit the 
poor in the end. Indeed, anecdotal and other evidence indicate that the political “rules of the 
game” continue to perpetuate patron-client relationships (or at least fail to correct these with 
alternative models) and thus what occurs in some cases is the proliferation of new political 
dynasties. It is also highly likely that reform-minded non-dynastic politicians are unable to make 
a dent on poverty (on average) considering that the political status quo remains unchanged. 
The empirical findings in this paper therefore suggest that a comprehensive poverty reduction 
and social protection program could be crucial for building an inclusive democratic leadership. 
Addressing the structural dependence of the electorate could begin to change the patron-client 
environment in to one wherein voters are less dependent on patrons. Nevertheless, sub-national 
efforts to push these reforms may produce highly uneven results, and may not necessarily be 
compatible with the incentives of political dynasties that seek to tighten their grip on local 
politics. This view is also consistent with studies that have shown the share of dynastic leaders to 
decline over time as a country becomes much more economically developed (e.g. Dal Bo et al.
2009). Such a strategy for reform, however, presumes that the largest and strongest political 
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dynasties have not also begun to control the national reform agenda. Furthermore, these reforms 
must also leverage media, to the extent that they could also help level the playing field while 
promoting stronger accountability and better governance. 
In addition, political reforms will be critical in helping families and communities break out of the 
dynasty-poverty trap. Alternative political candidates will need the support of political parties to 
convey their message of reform and non-traditional politics, built on empowerment, participation 
and accountability against patron-client relationships that thrive on poverty and inequality. Once 
elected, the same leaders will also need genuine political parties behind them in order to deliver 
on these reforms, if they are to win hearts and minds on lasting reform.
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TABLES
Table 1.1 Variables in the Regressions to Explain Poverty
VARIABLE CODE VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
child05 Under Five Mortality Rate 2003 Compiled from National Demographic Health Survey (NDHS) 2003
child05p1000 Under Five Mortality Rate 2003 Computed from National Demographic Health Survey (NDHS) 2003
liter03 Literacy Rate 2003 Functional Literacy, Education, and Mass Media Survey (FLEMMS) 2003
propirrig Proportion of Irrigated Area 2002 Compiled from Census of Agriculture Data
ginifarea Farm Area GINI Ratio 2002 Computed Census of Agriculture Data
dagritt0204 Change in Agricultural Terms of Trade Computed from National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB) Data
delec0204 Change in Access to Electricity from 2002 to 2004 Computed from National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB) Data
drd0708 Change in Road Density to 2007 to 2008 Computed from Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Data
carp0204 Change in Amount of Land Covered by CARP-LAD Program from 2002 to 2004 Compiled from Dep. of Agrarian Reform Data
pcexp03 Per Capita Expenditure 2003 Computed from National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB) Data
lnpcexp03 Natural Logarithm of Per Capita Expenditure 2003 Computed from National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB) Data
DYNSHA04 Dynastic Share of Elective Posts 2004 Computed from Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Data
DYNLAR04 Share of Largest Dynastic Clan 2004 Computed from Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Data
DYNHERF04 Hirschman-Herfindahl Index for Dynastic Clans 2004 Computed from Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Data
DPOPPOV0306 Change in Poverty from 2003 to 2006 Computed from National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB) DATA
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Table 1.2 Variables in the Regressions Examining Factors behind Political Dynasties
VARIABLE CODE VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
FAMPOVINC09 Family Poverty Incidence 2009 National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB)
PCI06 Per capita income 2006 National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB)
AMS AM Stations Complied by authors based on data from media networks
ARMM ARMM Indicator Compiled by authors
HDI1 Human Development Index Human Development Network
EDUC08
Education Index 2008 (Derived from Primary and Secondary Student to Teacher Ratios, 
Classroom to Student Ratios) National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB)
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Table 2. Focus on Dynastic Share
Dependent Variable: Change in Headcount Poverty Incidence from 2003 to 2006
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dynastic Share 2004 
0.47351 0.39194 0.26883 0.06162 -0.25305 -0.38059 -0.37884 -0.40236 -0.35122 -0.43290
[0.85520] [0.82968] [0.83215] [0.87391] [0.92386] [0.93565] [0.93776] [0.94060] [0.93726] [0.96541]
Natural Log of 2003 
Per Capita Income
0.68870** 0.72863** 0.75961*** 0.76809** 0.80679*** 0.68537** 0.84530** 1.08881** 1.02778**
[0.28251] [0.28317] [0.28652] [0.29558] [0.30184] [0.33482] [0.38743] [0.43236] [0.46101]
Change in Agricultural
Terms of Trade 2002 to 2004
1.88082 1.81390 2.10606 2.34214 2.81929* 3.04939* 1.86843 1.88649
[1.48728] [1.49331] [1.52413] [1.54330] [1.64633] [1.67385] [1.91695] [1.93100]
Farm Area 
GINI Coefficient
-1.07434 -0.84935 -0.93525 -0.71789 -0.53170 -0.45691 -0.51885
[1.35043] [1.48593] [1.50152] [1.52667] [1.54706] [1.54127] [1.55974]
Change in CARP 
Land Distribution 2002 to 2004
7.81649** 9.56154*** 9.91928*** 9.52095*** 10.17369*** 10.18409***
[3.15862] [3.40903] [3.44278] [3.48507] [3.50870] [3.53355]
Change in Access 
to Electricity 2002 to 2004
-1.04005 -1.11343 -1.42770 -1.75315 -1.65243
[1.24214] [1.24797] [1.30764] [1.32769] [1.36023]
Proportion of Irrigated Land 2002 0.38148 0.48722 0.52267 0.52659
[0.45074] [0.46965] [0.46840] [0.47180]
Under Five Mortality
Per 1000 Children 2003
7.85809 -0.16707 0.34935
[9.50515] [11.44592] [11.59773]
Functional Literacy 2003 -3.08880 -2.79456
[2.47866] [2.60081]
Change in Road Density
2007 to 2008
0.16041
[0.39818]
Constant 0.03279 -5.23993** -5.54735** -5.13904** -5.54945** -5.85913** -5.23762** -6.96752** -5.90030* -5.64265
[0.21075] [2.17255] [2.17765] [2.24252] [2.29244] [2.35928] [2.47602] [3.24663] [3.34356] [3.42735]
Observations 79 79 79 79 72 70 70 70 70 70
R-squared 0.00397 0.07620 0.09549 0.10316 0.17550 0.20046 0.20960 0.21835 0.23807 0.24016
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3. Focus on Largest Dynasty
Dependent Variable : Change in Headcount Poverty Incidence from 2003 to 2006
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Largest Dynastic Share -3.86399 -2.64403 -2.41456 -2.77440 -2.34180 -2.04221 -1.92682 -1.84647 -1.94401 -2.02685
[2.99510] [2.96713] [2.96111] [2.98548] [3.12868] [3.18393] [3.19528] [3.20632] [3.19056] [3.22217]
Natural Log of 2003 
Per Capita Income
0.64783** 0.68973** 0.71496** 0.72634** 0.76337** 0.64777* 0.80267** 1.05157** 0.99587**
[0.28598] [0.28679] [0.28808] [0.29869] [0.30660] [0.33809] [0.39088] [0.43473] [0.46441]
Change in Agricultural
Terms of Trade 2002 to 2004
1.86331 1.72384 1.99030 2.20217 2.66865 2.88842* 1.68559 1.67890
[1.47436] [1.48196] [1.51070] [1.53080] [1.63651] [1.66437] [1.90366] [1.91771]
Farm Area 
GINI Coefficient
-1.25198 -0.97931 -1.00619 -0.78503 -0.59065 -0.54028 -0.58015
[1.29167] [1.47780] [1.49884] [1.52666] [1.55050] [1.54294] [1.55818]
Change in CARP 
Land Distribution 2002 to 2004
7.65487** 9.29043*** 9.64510*** 9.25852*** 9.94049*** 9.92044***
[3.13700] [3.38936] [3.42548] [3.46972] [3.49253] [3.51858]
Change in Access 
to Electricity 2002 to 2004
-0.88740 -0.96493 -1.26924 -1.60364 -1.50272
[1.24692] [1.25372] [1.31417] [1.33317] [1.37184]
Proportion of Irrigated Land 2002 0.36994 0.47223 0.50799 0.51070
[0.45045] [0.46968] [0.46807] [0.47156]
Under Five Mortality
Per 1000 Children 2003
7.56310 -0.65424 -0.25725
[9.49397] [11.41882] [11.55518]
Functional Literacy 2003 -3.16544 -2.91771
[2.47225] [2.58354]
Change in Road Density
2007 to 2008
0.14040
[0.38966]
Constant
0.35370*
-
4.69103**
-
5.05376** -4.52805*
-
5.07477** -5.44194** -4.86817* -6.55889* -5.42874 -5.19227
[0.18627] [2.23435] [2.24405] [2.30955] [2.38366] [2.47765] [2.58045] [3.34703] [3.44463] [3.53141]
Observations 79 79 79 79 72 70 70 70 70 70
R-squared 0.02116 0.08307 0.10219 0.11344 0.18151 0.20357 0.21214 0.22025 0.24099 0.24265
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4. Focus on Dynastic Concentration (Dynastic Hirschman-Herfindahl Indicator);
Dependent Variable : Change in Headcount Poverty Incidence from 2003 to 2006
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dynastic Herfindahl Index -9.75255 -6.90226 -6.78473 -6.68864 -5.69336 -4.59936 -4.47789 -4.20368 -5.42048 -5.66820
[6.70408] [6.66205] [6.63199] [6.64573] [6.78240] [6.93246] [6.95067] [6.98113] [6.99108] [7.06999]
Natural Log of 2003 
Per Capita Income
0.63716** 0.67710** 0.70531** 0.71610** 0.75666** 0.63823* 0.79201** 1.04654** 0.98636**
[0.28605] [0.28637] [0.28886] [0.29959] [0.30820] [0.33992] [0.39335] [0.43332] [0.46317]
Change in Agricultural
Terms of Trade 2002 to 2004
1.91665 1.80604 2.04469 2.24639 2.71724 2.93216* 1.64447 1.63540
[1.46803] [1.47668] [1.50651] [1.52775] [1.63188] [1.65976] [1.90183] [1.91558]
Farm Area 
GINI Coefficient
-1.08063 -0.81539 -0.85541 -0.64071 -0.45430 -0.40434 -0.44100
[1.28055] [1.45010] [1.46930] [1.49510] [1.51849] [1.50856] [1.52228]
Change in CARP 
Land Distribution 2002 to 
2004
7.57576** 9.16956*** 9.52916*** 9.15815** 9.82965*** 9.80303***
[3.13766] [3.40328] [3.43853] [3.48156] [3.49295] [3.51861]
Change in Access 
to Electricity 2002 to 2004
-0.90907 -0.98387 -1.28454 -1.62052 -1.51270
[1.24198] [1.24819] [1.30947] [1.32386] [1.36198]
Proportion of Irrigated Land 
2002
0.37582 0.47644 0.51260 0.51573
[0.44993] [0.46922] [0.46677] [0.47018]
Under Five Mortality
Per 1000 Children 2003
7.44858 -1.39051 -0.99686
[9.49881] [11.46262] [11.58914]
Functional Literacy 2003 -3.37673 -3.11977
[2.48738] [2.59124]
Change in Road Density
2007 to 2008
0.15110
[0.38945]
Constant
0.40842**
-
4.56530**
-
4.90430** -4.51991*
-
5.05723** -5.45651** -4.85712* -6.53242* -5.20499 -4.94033
[0.20314] [2.24168] [2.24641] [2.29637] [2.36399] [2.46156] [2.56971] [3.34799] [3.46589] [3.55671]
Observations 79 79 79 79 72 70 70 70 70 70
R-squared 0.02675 0.08639 0.10669 0.11521 0.18329 0.20393 0.21279 0.22064 0.24387 0.24579
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5. Dependent Variable: DYNSHA (Share of Dynasties in Total Positions in the Province)
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
FAMPOVINC09 0.00129 0.00031 0.00088 0.01187*** 0.00091 -0.00067 0.00143 0.01623*** 0.00154 0.00129 0.00052 0.0382
[0.00304] [0.00290] [0.00277] [0.00374] [0.00358] [0.00351] [0.00368] [0.00394] [0.00195] [0.00190] [0.00190] [0.02886]
PCI06 0 0 0 0.00001
[0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001]
AMS 0.00681* 0.00682** 0.01706*** 0.00749** 0.00640* 0.01695*** 0.00512 0.00623* 0.03648*
[0.00353] [0.00339] [0.00263] [0.00366] [0.00356] [0.00296] [0.00356] [0.00350] [0.01897]
ARMM 0.18371** 0.30227*** 0.20506** 0.39629*** 0.15506** 0.57977*
[0.07730] [0.06839] [0.09571] [0.09184] [0.07157] [0.30602]
HDI1 -0.10923 -0.37265 0.19909 0.90359*
[0.41759] [0.41812] [0.53751] [0.47936]
EDUC08 -0.00191** -0.00165* -0.00069 0.00869
[0.00090] [0.00091] [0.00098] [0.00744]
Constant 0.41715** 0.46157** 0.32925* -0.21036 0.45465 0.61253* 0.22194 -0.71412** 0.59125*** 0.54427*** 0.44170*** -2.04028
[0.19193] [0.18412] [0.19466] [0.21381] [0.32654] [0.32178] [0.39852] [0.36163] [0.11605] [0.12276] [0.12718] [1.85785]
Observations 78 78 78 78 77 77 77 77 78 78 78 78
R-squared 0.01199 0.06282 0.1339 0.88861 0.01309 0.06188 0.14069 0.85711 0.0613 0.0872 0.13802 0.35428
Standard errors in brackets
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Regressions 4, 8 and 12 contain the contiguity matrix which accounts for provinces with contiguous borders. Due to space constraints, the results are no longer reported here; but these are 
available from the authors upon request.
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Table 6. Dependent Variable: DYNLAR (Share of Largest Dynastic Family in Total Positions in the Province)
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
FAMPOVINC09
0.00130* 0.00162** 0.00156*** 0.00218* 0.00106 0.00156* 0.00205** 0.00285** 0.00112** 0.00118*** 0.00094** 0.01771
[0.00069] [0.00066] [0.00058] [0.00118] [0.00081] [0.00080] [0.00081] [0.00133] [0.00046] [0.00043] [0.00041] [0.01649]
PCI06
0 0 0.00000*** 0.00001***
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
AMS
-0.00230*** -0.00231*** -0.00470*** -0.00234*** -0.00271*** -0.00491*** -0.00207** -0.00171** 0.008
[0.00080] [0.00071] [0.00083] [0.00084] [0.00079] [0.00100] [0.00081] [0.00075] [0.01084]
ARMM
0.06907*** 0.09593*** 0.07917*** 0.10408*** 0.04999*** 0.19592
[0.01614] [0.02157] [0.02113] [0.03092] [0.01543] [0.17481]
HDI1
0.00159 0.08523 0.27209** 0.68699***
[0.09451] [0.09581] [0.11869] [0.16137]
EDUC08
0.00015 0.00005 0.00036* 0.00536
[0.00021] [0.00021] [0.00021] [0.00425]
Constant
0.00664 -0.00781 -0.04138 -0.17597*** 0.03558 -0.01491 -0.13788 -0.36020*** 0.01666 0.03672 0.00331 -1.15217
[0.04384] [0.04192] [0.04064] [0.06743] [0.07390] [0.07373] [0.08800] [0.12174] [0.02713] [0.02807] [0.02742] [1.06125]
Observations 78 78 78 78 77 77 77 77 78 78 78 78
R-squared 0.00627 0.06342 0.27247 0.78648 0.02507 0.05002 0.192 0.68772 0.01108 0.08018 0.22768
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Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Regressions 4, 8 and 12 contain the contiguity matrix which accounts for provinces with contiguous borders. Due to space constraints, the results are no longer reported here; but these are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 7. Dependent Variable: DYNHERF (Dynastic Hirschman-Herfindahl Indicator for Each Province)
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
FAMPOVINC09
0.00033 0.00041** 0.00042** 0.00100*** 0.00019 0.0003 0.00053** 0.00129*** 0.00035** 0.00036*** 0.00025** 0.00518
[0.00021] [0.00021] [0.00017] [0.00038] [0.00024] [0.00024] [0.00023] [0.00042] [0.00014] [0.00014] [0.00012] [0.00445]
PCI06
0 0 0.00000*** 0.00000***
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000]
AMS
-0.00056** -0.00056*** -0.00080*** -0.00052** -0.00066*** -0.00083*** -0.00056** -0.00040* 0.00266
[0.00025] [0.00020] [0.00027] [0.00025] [0.00022] [0.00032] [0.00025] [0.00021] [0.00292]
ARMM
0.02768*** 0.03584*** 0.02976*** 0.03976*** 0.02260*** 0.06908
[0.00462] [0.00698] [0.00599] [0.00983] [0.00439] [0.04715]
HDI1
-0.02388 -0.00521 0.06983** 0.17593***
[0.02817] [0.02882] [0.03366] [0.05129]
EDUC08
-0.00001 -0.00004 0.00010* 0.00153
[0.00007] [0.00006] [0.00006] [0.00115]
Constant 0.0054 0.00194 -0.01394 -0.06099*** 0.02456 0.01324 -0.03692 -0.11518*** 0.00759 0.01317 -0.00186 -0.34013
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[0.01347] [0.01306] [0.01162] [0.02183] [0.02203] [0.02218] [0.02496] [0.03869] [0.00839] [0.00875] [0.00780] [0.28625]
Observations 78 78 78 78 77 77 77 77 78 78 78 78
R-squared 0.01807 0.04835 0.37652 0.76557 0.09122 0.09868 0.31815 0.66914 0.00859 0.06361 0.34552
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Regressions 4, 8 and 12 contain the contiguity matrix which accounts for provinces with contiguous borders. Due to space constraints, the results are no longer reported here; but these are 
available from the authors upon request. +AMDG
